It strikes me that this exercise is entirely designed to create an outside scapegoat for future policy missteps and failures. I think the point that you make several times, but not strenuously enough, is that the BOE is afraid of leading because they are afraid if they are wrong, they will be held to account in the court of public, and potentially Parliamentary, opinion. and in the end, the one truth across all central banks I have observed is that no central banker is willing to admit their failures while still in the chair. maybe in a retrospective memoir when it no longer matters, but to think the MPC, and every central bank, will adopt changes that can be clearly understood is fantasy in my view.
It strikes me that this exercise is entirely designed to create an outside scapegoat for future policy missteps and failures. I think the point that you make several times, but not strenuously enough, is that the BOE is afraid of leading because they are afraid if they are wrong, they will be held to account in the court of public, and potentially Parliamentary, opinion. and in the end, the one truth across all central banks I have observed is that no central banker is willing to admit their failures while still in the chair. maybe in a retrospective memoir when it no longer matters, but to think the MPC, and every central bank, will adopt changes that can be clearly understood is fantasy in my view.
One should never forget that Bernanke bears major reponsibility for crashing the US economy in 2008!